Causes of collusion among people in construction by Oke, Ayodeji et al.
342 
 
CAUSES OF COLLUSION AMONG PEOPLE IN 
CONSTRUCTION 
Ayodeji Oke1, Clinton Aigbavboa and Zacharia Mangena 
1 University of Johannesburg, Doornfontein Campus, Johannesburg, 2028, South Africa 
Collusion is an unethical and disreputable agreement among parties of similar 
interests with the intention of achieving a goal through immoral and dishonest means. 
Proper ethical procurement practice in the construction industry, will enable the 
Construction Industry Development Board (CIDB) to achieve their mandate which is 
to promote uniformity in the construction procurement; efficient and effective 
infrastructure delivery; and development of the emerging contractors, including 
transformation. Furthermore, the Competition Commission of South Africa (CCSA) 
to also achieve their mandate which is fair competition in all industries. With 
collusion in existence it will be difficult for the CIDB and CCSA to achieve their 
mandate. This study examined the influences of this practice among competitors and 
stakeholders in the construction industry. Various causal factors of collusion among 
parties were extracted from review of existing and relevant literature materials and 
they were further evaluated to arrive at the specific ones that are relevant to the 
construction industry and selected area of study. Using these factors, close-ended 
questionnaires were prepared and administered to construction stakeholders with 
adequate level of experience in the construction industry. The number of 
questionnaire distributed is 50 and 45 were returned out of which 5 were not correctly 
and completely filled. The distribution method used was self-administration. In 
addition, purposive sampling was used.  The findings from the 40 respondents 
indicates that the major cause of collusion in the construction industry is greed of 
various stakeholders that are shouldered with the responsibilities of managing and 
monitoring construction contracts and activities especially the contractors. Political 
influence was also identified as a major reason for collusion among other factors. 
[Empowering emerging contractors, a well regulated environment, a fair competition, 
improving procurement management are the most important aspects that can 
minimize collusion to occur. Furthermore, good ethical practice, is one of the aspect 
concerned with the monitoring and regulation of professionals, contractors and 
general construction activities should therefore ensure that appropriate sanctions and 
punishments are applied for any members found culpable. 
Keywords: collusion, Construction industry, corruption, project performance, project 
stakeholders, unethical practice. 
INTRODUCTION 
Public and private procurement particularly high-value and large projects usually 
involves opportunities which attracts collusive tendering (Organization of Economic 
Co-operation and Development, OECD 2010). There are various forms of collusion 
which cartels mostly practice, which are Price fixing, bid Rigging and Market 
allocation or division. Price fixing is when two or more competitors agree on 
increasing prices, restore or otherwise keep prices where their services are being sold. 
Is not necessary for horizontal competitors to be part of a conspiracy or to accord on 
charging similar prices (OECD 2008). Furthermore, price fixing has many forms, also 
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any arrangement between competitors that aims to restrict competition is prohibited 
by the competition law (OECD 2008). 
In the bid rigging form of collusion, contractors conspire on raising prices (both public 
and private sector). Analysis of private and public tenders indicates that the company 
that is going to win the tender, tends to be close to the maximum project value, that 
the procuring entity would be willing to pay (Ilango, 2014). In other words, 
competitors agree in advance who should win a certain tender. Price fixing, on the 
other hand, not all competitors participate in the conspiracy (Centre for Competition, 
Investment and Economic Regulation CUTS 2008). This form of collusion 
themselves to specific clients or type of clients, territories or products. For example, 
they choose one competitor to bid on contracts led by particular clients or type of 
clients. Thus, they will not be   allowed to bid on any contracts that is not been 
allocated to (OECD, 2008). Furthermore, the companies also agree to bid to only 
certain geographic areas but to hide the conspiracy they will intentionally bid a higher 
price to clients in geographic areas not allocated to (CUTS 2008). 
The South African Competition Act (1998) states that any agreement between, or any 
joint activity of two or more, or a decision and association of firms is not allowed by 
the act, when collusive practice is involved.  However, the number of collusive 
tendering or construction cartels have been increasing drastically (CIDB 2010). 
Several investigations by competition tribunal, National Prosecuting Agency (NPA) 
and other authorities have shown a widespread use of cartels and corruption within the 
South African construction industry (Hekima 2014). This study examined the causes 
of collusion among stakeholders in the construction industry with a view of suggesting 
appropriate measures for eliminating or reducing collusion in the industry. 
REVIEW OF THE CAUSES OF COLLUSION 
Causes of collusion are the factors that motivate collusion to take place. Doree (2004) 
on collusion highlight the factors that cause collusion that it is caused by contractor 
greed and created by clients. Furthermore, an investigation by Khumalo et al. (2010) 
brought out that the practice of collusion has become a standard business practice. Ray 
et al (1999) cite a number of factors that have been provided by market participants on 
why they engage in collusive tendering they include: The time given to compile tender 
documents is not enough, other factor may be that construction companies do not have 
enough resources to complete the construction works or engaging in collusion just to 
be known by clients for future projects. 
Zarkada-Fraser and Stinkmore (2000) suggest that collusive tendering or corrupt 
practices is a made by an informed professional. A person with particular attitude and 
characteristics a sense of right and wrong and a set of personal and organizational 
objectives to meet. In addition to this, public officials frequently use public powers for 
their own benefit for instance allowing bribes from contractor in exchange for 
granting tenders (OECD 2010). Furthermore, Ayodele (2011) explains that corruption 
means when one is using powers by being dishonest, performing illegal practices or 
acting immoral using it as an advantage for their own benefit. Unethical practice in 
any field, particularly construction industry is labelled as violation of the competition 
act and the Construction Industry Development Board (cidb) rules and regulation. 
Collusion arises from poor regulatory environment, procurement management and the 
way firms behave (Hekima 2014). It is recommended by Ratshisusu (2014) that 
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competition among horizontal competitors, procurement practices that are transparent 
and the oversight that is effective is very vital for the construction industry. Ayodele 
(2011) also explains the causes of corruption in his study of corruption in the 
construction industry, the study highlighted that poverty, and politics in award of 
contract / "God fatherism" are the main causes of corruption in the construction 
industry. 
Furthermore, the OECD (2012) recognised that a transparent and anti-completive 
public is vital to make sure that services and goods that are being delivered by the 
government offer value for money. However, according to the (OECD 2012) 
procurement systems by the government can be stymied by bid rigging and other 
collusion practices. In view of this, this section examines various causes of collusion 
among stakeholders in the construction industry. 
Regulatory Perspective 
Regulation is an important tool in any field of work or industry for that matter. Several 
investigation provides literature in the effects of regulation policies particularly for 
competition in markets OECD (2014). In South Africa, there are certain laws that are 
set to promote fair competition markets, unethical behaviours with the aim of 
promoting growth and development in any industry. In South Africa the CIDB is 
empowered to regulate the construction industry. Which basically registering 
contractors and regulating with set of regulation requirements. Furthermore, 
companies must follow certain regulatory requirements, particular with regards to 
registering of contractors. These regulations by the CIDB includes grading of 
contractors which is a critical tool to have, it ensures that contractors in the industry 
have minimum requirements to undertake any project. 
However, Ratshisusu (2014) put forward the idea that the CIDB system for grading 
contractors has two main deficiencies. Firstly, adequate information is not provided to 
clients, this information includes the ability and the capacity of contractors in 
undertaking the construction works which is expected from the CIDB grading system 
to provide such information. Furthermore, if these information is provided to the 
client, it could give assistance to the client to ensure that the contractor is fit to 
undertake the works based on the grading, this information can be made available by 
the CIDB. 
Firm Perspective 
Companies have a pivotal role to play, for a culture of competition to be there in the 
construction industry. In essence competition must be amongst companies instead of 
the cooperation of the culture through collusive tendering. According to Ratshisusu 
(2014) bid rigging, in the South African construction industry was established as the 
culture of the industry which has been existing for a while and which only the top tier 
companies participate. Furthermore, an investigation by Khumalo et al. (2010) 
brought out that the practice of collusion has become a standard business practice 
which South African companies has adopted. With regards to that, Ratshisusu 
(2014:602) points out that the top-tier construction companies, thus engage in 
collusive tendering to damage not only the clients but also the participation of new 
contractors. In addition, Munshi (2013) state that emerging companies believe that 
collusion stole opportunities for them to grow and they also have a right to 
compensation. Furthermore, it is believed by Ratshisusu (2014) that if bid rigging did 
not occur among the top-tier companies, new companies could have grown at this 
point in time.  
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For instance, projects that involve the construction of residential properties, civil 
works such as roads, and building works such as convention centres would have been 
a great opportunity for small medium construction companies to gain experience 
needed to acquire the CIDB higher grading. Take Netherlands as an example, 
companies were in collusive tendering with the aim of excluding emerging companies 
(Doree 2004). Ratshisusu (2014) also suggest that collusive tendering cases in South 
Africa should be prosecuted thoroughly to get better insights on the methods that 
should be used to destroy the culture of collusion. Furthermore, is necessary to shift 
the manner in which companies compete for projects, as a way to eradicate collusive 
tendering. Most of emerging do not engage in collusive tendering as they mainly rely 
on subcontractor works (Ratshisusu, 2014). Furthermore, almost companies that have 
the capacity and the ability to deliver large infrastructure projects, according to 
Hekima (2014) tend to engage in collusive tendering rather than competing with 
emerging contractors. 
Regardless of the CIDB Act in the year 2000, with an objective of encouraging the 
participation of emerging contractors in the sector of construction, it was expected that 
the growth of emerging contractors will increase drastically to such extent that they 
compete against the top-tier companies, however in reality only the top-tier companies 
are able to obtain large infrastructure projects (Ratshisusu 2014). Although World 
Bank (2014) suggest that the reason emerging contractors are not gaining experience 
is due to the fact that they are lacking entrepreneur skills, which is they mainly focus 
on short-term financial gains rather that growing their company. However, Munshi 
(2013) also put forward the idea that big construction companies are lacking 
transformation, skills transfer and tend not to empower emerging construction 
companies. With regards to above mentioned issues the CIDB has placed programmes 
particularly for emerging contractors on how to grow their companies in the industry, 
the programmes focus mainly on the entrepreneurial culture (Ratshisusu, 2014). 
Procurement Perspective 
The process of procurement firstly starts with identifying a certain project, if it is a 
government project then the budget for that project is drafted. At this point in time is 
the government responsibility to deliver the project. According to Doree (2004), the 
government used to deliver public construction projects on its own, i.e. the 
professionals employed by the government would design, plan and construct the work 
without consulting external services. However, developing countries including South 
Africa has copied higher-income national system of separating key functions. Thus 
responsibilities are divided among a larger number of people, who essentially perform 
complementary activities. According to Sohail and Cavill (2008), these participants 
must comply with different control mechanism the purpose of which is to ensure 
accountability. 
However, Ratshisusu (2014) put forward the idea that once two or more parties 
engage in collusion or agreements it is easy for them to break the rules as a result an 
environment is created whereby control mechanism need to be strengthened. The 
concern of van de Ryt et al (2010) is the reason for frequent breakdown of control 
mechanisms. Sohail and Cavill (2008)   stated that the problem arises from separating 
functions which creates an opportunity to break because mechanism for controlling 
are separated at each stage of the procurement process (planning, design, 
construction). Furthermore, functions are sequential i.e. one stage has to be finished 
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before the other stage can start, however in practice functions overlap and there is 
interdependence among the participants at different stages. 
The type of procurement procedure plays a role for collusion to take pace. According 
to Van de Ryt et al. (2010), the Dutch Parliamentary Committee (DPC) in reaction to 
collusion of 2002 proposed a tougher public sector procurement procedure as a 
strategy to combat corruption. This clearly shows that the procurement procedures are 
prone to collusion.  
According to the City of Cape Town and South African National Roads Agency Ltd 
(SANRAL) the manner in which the government planned large infrastructure projects 
was prone to collusive tendering. The time CCSA was conducting an investigation on 
collusive tendering in 2006 to 2009, the government already began with large 
construction projects for roads, FIFA World Cup Stadia upgrades and Eskom power 
stations (Hekima Advisory, 2014). Furthermore, for road construction SANRAL 
separated some parts of the work in packages then after invited certain companies to 
participate in tendering.  Competition Tribunal settlements revealed that companies 
such as Haw and Inglis, Aveng, Murray and Roberts, Basil Read, Raubex, Stefannuti 
and WBHO formed a cartel to agree upon certain prices so that horizontal competitors 
submit prices that are phony Hekima (2014). Ratshisusu (2014) point out that, at that 
point in time there was contractors that were already capable of undertaking large 
infrastructure projects, so basically it was their chance to grow and gain experience. 
Ratshisusu (2014) also put forward the idea that large infrastructure projects such as 
Eskom power station and World Cup stadia upgrades were prioritised by large 
companies as there was an opportunity to make money. This clearly shows that the 
procurement procedure that the government uses for large infrastructure projects 
facilitated companies to collude (Ratshisusu 2014). 
In addition, Ratshisusu (2014) states that the government capability to undertake or 
manage large infrastructure procurement is poor and prone to collusive tendering. 
Furthermore, it is said that the government is lacking required skills to procure for 
large infrastructure projects such that they end up consulting external service which 
has the capacity to manage such projects. Hekima Advisory (2014) puts forward the 
idea that the primary cause of bid rigging is that the management of procurement 
process is being done by external consultants.   
The manner in which the government award projects contributes to collusive 
tendering. Usually projects are awarded to lowest qualifying bid which makes it easy 
for companies to decide that the winning bid should be low. It is very vital to shift the 
manner in which contracts are awarded. Moreover, it is found by Ratshisusu (2014) 
because certain companies will price low with intention of winning the bid, but with 
no capacity to deliver such work.  
In addition, the awarding of contracts on the basis of the lowest qualifying bidder on 
bids that are sealed depends on certain number of key assumptions such as if the 
design is completed before tender. The consequences for this assumption would be, if 
the designs are incomplete means that there might be changes in the post contract 
stage which gives contractors a chance to negotiate for variations and ridiculous 
claims (Sohail and Cavill 2008). In addition, the main root that makes the system of 
awarding contracts to the lowest bidder prone to collusive tendering is that all aspects 
of the project are already finalised and detailed in the tender document. 
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According to Ratshisusu (2014) concerns are made on the role of consulting firm 
when managing the procurement process, particularly in the private sector. As there is 
no express requirement for a public procurement process in private sector projects, the 
consulting companies are often provided the latitude to identify and recommend 
suitable contractor for a project. According to Sohail and Cavill (2008) the main 
concern is that consulting firms appoint contractors based on favouritism and tend to 
accept their parti
capacity to undertake the work. Therefore, Ratshisusu (2014) put forward the idea that 
if a contractor does not have the capacity to undertake the work but yet participate in 
the tender process, the contractors will end up colluding, as they have knowledge who 
they are competing against.  
Khumalo et al. (2010) also provides a number and similar reasons why tenders engage 
in collusion or cover pricing, which includes the short period of preparing tender 
documents, the cost of bidding and avoiding offending customers by not tendering. 
Several findings by Dlamini (2010), describe that there are changes in the business 
cycle. Throughout the period of recession or the turndown of the economy, collusive 
tendering, cover pricing including bid rigging may be used as a means of distributing 
the available work as a result of preventing financial disaster, for those who are 
participating in the market. However, the findings by Doree (2004) also highlighted 
that those who are participating in the market do not find collusive tendering as 
violation of the law or as a criminal offense. Also, it is stated that the competition law 
is not breached when a phony high bid is put in during the bidding process. However, 
Khumalo et al. (2010), state that any interaction between horizontal competitors with 
the aim of reaching an agreement over collusion is a violation of competition law. In 
addition, according to the OECD (2009) any joint decision with the aim of supressing 
other competitors, is indeed a concerted practice as defined in the act. 
[In summary below highlights the factors that causes collusion. Doree and Kashiwagi 
(2008) also suggest that Political influence is one of the factors that causes collusion. 
In addition, Zarkada and Skitmore (2000) urge that poor ethics and corporate 
governance is a cause of collusion. The other cause of collusion according to 
Ratshisusu (2014) is the size of the project. In addition, the OECD (2010) also urge 
that largest construction projects are prone to corruption. Ratshisusu (2014) suggest 
that a poor regulatory environment is one of main cause for companies to engage in 
collusive practices. Furthermore, it was found that awarding tenders based on 
favouritism is also a main cause of collusion (Sohail and Calvill 2008). Kashiwagi 
(2015) also put forward the idea that ignorance of clients is also a main cause. The 
other cause of collusion is poor procurement management (van de Ryt et al 2010). 
Accoding to Sohail and Cavill (2008) the number of contractual links has an impact, 
the higher the contractual links the more procurement systems being manipulated. 
Khumalo et al (2010) suggest that entrenched interest is one of the causes of collusion. 
Ratshisusu (2014) also suggest that the inconsistency of anti-corruption policies is the 
other factor that causes collusion among the people. Ray et al (1999) urges that the 
period given to compile tender documents should be enough. Furthermore, a good 
oversight and supervision of procurement procedures is vital (Sohail and Calvill 
2008). In addition to procurement procedures Hakima (2014) suggests that too many 
stages of procurement procedure can cause collusion. Moreover, Sohail and Cavill 
(2008) urges that separation of key functions is also a cause of collusion. Furthermore, 
incomplete designs is also considered as a cause of collusion (Well 2014). According 
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to Ayodele (2011) Poverty is also one the factors that causes collusion and corruption 
among people.  
METHODOLOGY 
To examine the causes of collusion in the South African construction industry, survey 
design was adopted with the intention of obtaining information from individuals and 
experts in the area of study. Using quantitative approach, questionnaires were 
administered on construction professionals practicing within construction, consulting 
and government establishments within Gauteng region of South Africa. These 
includes quantity surveyors, architects, construction managers, project managers and 
engineers. The number of questionnaire distributed is 50 and 45 were returned out of 
which 5 were not correctly and completely filled. The distribution method used was 
self-administration. In addition, purposive sampling was used. A minimum of 5 years 
of experience was adopted as the basis for the choice of respondents. This is to ensure 
that the respondents possess a minimum level of knowledge of the industry by virtue 
of their practice and involvement in construction process and activities. 
The questionnaire was prepared to evaluate the perception of professionals regarding 
the causes of collusion as well as giving respondents a chance to rank the identified 
causes. The questionnaire is divided into two sections in which the first section is 
concerned with general and background information of respondents while the second 
section focuses essentially on the causes of collusion in the construction industry. A 
cover page was also provided which basically a cover letter is highlighting a 
description of the researcher and the institution which the researcher is from. The 
cover letter seeks permission of respondents to participate in the survey and also 
highlighted the main purpose of the study. 
To rate the causes of collusion in the construction industry, a rating scale with five (5) 
points was adopted. The adopted 5-point scale was as follows: 1=Strongly Disagree 
(SD); 2=Disagree (D); 3=Neutral (N); 4=Agree (A); and 5=Strongly Agree. The 5-
point scale were transformed to mean item score for each aspect to rank the factors. 
The ranking helped to identify the relative importance of each variable as recognized 
by the respondents. The calculation of the relative mean item score (MIS) was 
determined from the total of all weighted respondents and then relating it to the total 
scores on all the selected criteria, considered together, are the indices of agreement 
with the causes of collusion. The mean item score (MIS) was calculated using;  
MIS= 1n1 + 2n2 + 3n3 +4n4+5n5  
                           
Where;  
n1 = Number of respondents for factor number 1;  
n2 = Number of respondents for factor number 2;  
n3 = Number of respondents for factor number 3;  
n4 = Number of respondents for factor number 4;  
n5 = Number of respondents for factor number 5;  
N = Total number of respondents  
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After analytical calculation and the computation of standard deviation (SD), the 
variables were then ranked in descending order of their mean item score from highest 
to lowest. 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
From the received 45 questionnaires, 40 were completely filled and analysed 
accordingly. Figure 1 reveals the findings relating to construction projects that 
frequently experience collusion. The respondents perceived that 17.4% of construction 
projects that experience collusion are road construction projects, followed by 
shopping malls (15.1%), building renovations (12.8%), Stadia (12.8%), Hospitals 
(11.6%), Public Offices (11.6%), Railways Construction (7.0%) and the last one to be 
ranked is Housing Estate at (7.0%). 
 
Figure 1: Construction Project that experience collusion 
Table 1 reveals the respondents ranking of the factors causing the collusion in the 
a good level of reliability of the data.  
According to the ranking (R) using the calculated mean item score (MIS) and standard 
greed was ranked first with MIS score of 4.12 and SD of 0.980; political influence 
with MIS of 4.00 and SD of 1.204 was second important factor; poor ethics and 
corporate governance was ranked third with MIS of 3.98 and SD of 0.987; size of the 
project was ranked fourth with MIS of 3.90 and SD of 0.944; poor regulatory 
environment with MIS of3.76 and SD of 0.969 was the firth important factor; 
favouritism in awarding contract was ranked sixth with MIS of 3.71 and SD of 1.146; 
ignorance of clients was ranked seventh with MIS of 3.63 and SD of 1.090; poor 
procurement management was ranked eighth with MIS of 3.61 and SD of 1.022; high 
number of contractual links was ranked ninth with MIS of 3.59 and SD of 1.048; 
entrenched interest was ranked tenth with MIS of 3.56 and SD of 0.950; inconsistency 
of anti-corruption policies was ranked eleventh with MIS of 3.56 and SD of 1.097; 
while period given to prepare tender documents with MIS of  3.49 and SD of 1.287 
was the twelfth important factor.  
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Table 1: The causes of collusion in the construction industry 
 Factors MIS SD Ranking 
 4.12 0.980 1 
Political influence  4.00 1.204 2 
Poor ethics and corporate governance  3.98 0.987 3 
Size of the project  3.90 0.944 4 
Poor regulatory environment  3.76 0.969 5 
Favouritism in Awarding  3.71 1.146 6 
Ignorance of clients  3.63 1.090 7 
Poor procurement management  3.61 1.022 8 
High number of contractual links  3.59 1.048 9 
Entrenched interest  3.56 0.950 10 
Inconsistency of anti-corruption policies  3.56 1.097 11 
Period given to prepare tender documents  3.49 1.29 12 
Poor oversight and supervision  3.41 1.072 13 
Too many stages of procurement procedure  3.29 1.031 14 
Separation of key functions  3.05 0.921 15 
Incomplete designs  3.00 1.025 16 
Poverty 3.00 1.342 17 
 
Other causes of collusion include poor oversight supervision with MIS of 3.41 and SD 
of 1.072; too many stages of procurement procedure with MIS of 3.29 and SD of 
1.031; separation of key functions was ranked fifteenth with MIS of 3.05 and SD of 
0.921; incomplete designs with MIS of 3.00 and SD of 1.025 as well as poverty which 
was ranked seventeenth, with MIS of 3.00 and SD of 1.342.  
The result of these study is similar to the findings by, Doree and Kashiwagi (2015) 
collusion. 
Sohail and Cavill (2008) also suggested that political influence is also a main factor 
that causes collusion. Furthermore, a study by Ratshisusu (2014) also revealed that 
poor procurement management is one of the main factors that causes collusion which 
the study also revealed similar results. Moreover, study by Zarkada-Fraser and 
Skitmore (2000) also suggested that collusive tendering is a decision made by an 
individual, which supports the results that poor ethics and corporate governance is one 
the factors that causes collusion. However, the findings was not in agreement with the 
study by Sohail and Cavill (2008) where incomplete designs were highlighted as 
major factor that causes collusion. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The objective of this study is to determine the factors that causes collusion in the 
construction industry. The reviewed literature materials revealed that the main causes 
ethics and corporate governance, poor regulatory environment, poor oversight and 
supervision, poor procurement management, separation of key functions , favouritism 
in awarding, too many stages of procurement procedure, incomplete designs  ,high 
number of contractual links, political influence, poverty, size of the project, 
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entrenched interest, inconsistency of anti-corruption policies and period given to 
prepare tender documents were among the identified causes of collusion.  
Findings obtained from the analysis of questionnaires administered on construction 
management, poor ethics and corporate governance, size of the project, poverty, 
favouritism in awarding, poor regulatory environment, inconsistency of anti-
corruption policies, entrenched interest, period given to prepare tender documents 
were the top ten causes of collusion among people in the construction industry. 
[Empowering emerging contractors, a well regulated environment, a fair competition, 
improving procurement management are the most important aspects that can minimize 
collusion to occur. Furthermore, good ethical practice, is one of the aspect that 
professionals should adapt. 
mance of 
construction projects but will also lead to bad reputation for stakeholders in the 
industry, especially consultants and contractors. Therefore, to minimize the 
occurrence of collusion, there is a need to empower emerging contractors, maintain a 
well regulated environment, ensure a fair competition among bidders and improve 
procurement management techniques and procedures. Furthermore, stakeholders in 
the industry, especially construction professionals tasked with the responsibilities of 
regulating, maintain and controlling construction process and activities need to 
maintain good ethical practice in dealing with other internal and external members of 
the industry. 
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